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Trading in influence – a new criminal offence
In November 2015 the Organised Crime and Anti-corruption 
Legislation Bill was passed by Parliament. An omnibus bill, 
it amended numerous different acts in relation to (among 
other things) money laundering, organised crime, corruption 
and bribery offences. One of its stated aims was to bring 
New Zealand legislation up to date to enable New Zealand 
to finally ratify the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC), which it did in December that year. 
The merits and potential demerits of the bill have been 
discussed previously (Macaulay and Gregory, 2015), but one 
thing that requires further attention is the creation of a new 
offence of ‘trading in influence’.
The offence was created as an amendment 
to the Crimes Act 1961 and is set out in 
section 105F:
Every person is liable to 
imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 7 years who corruptly 
accepts or obtains, or agrees or offers 
to accept or attempts to obtain, a 
bribe for that person or another 
person with intent to influence an 
official in respect of any act or 
omission by that official in the 
official’s official capacity (whether or 
not the act or omission is within the 
scope of the official’s authority).
Its wording is clearly based on the 
relevant passage from UNCAC, albeit in a 
much abbreviated form: The wording of 
the new offence is admirably succinct, as 
is its refusal to distinguish between 
domestic and overseas jurisdictions, 
which is in stark contrast to other 
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amendments made by the Organised 
Crime and Anti-corruption Legislation 
Bill. Even following the amendments, for 
example, bribery is still permitted under 
the Crimes Act as long as (a) the bribe is to 
a foreign official; (b) the value of the bribe 
is small;1 and (c) it is paid to expedite a 
‘routine government action’, rather than 
for any extra service (s105C(3)). To be 
fair, such routine government actions are 
now more tightly defined than in the past, 
and one final caveat is that businesses 
must now keep a register of such bribes 
under amendments to the Companies 
Act, section 194(1A). Nevertheless, it still 
seems incongruous to many that such a 
defence exists, and it is certainly against 
the wording of UNCAC, which allows for 
no exceptions to any form of bribery.2
The new offence also has substantial 
coverage, taking into account central and 
local government, as well as education. Its 
interpretation (s.99) usefully defines an 
official as:
any person in the service of the 
Sovereign in right of New Zealand 
(whether that service is honorary or 
not, and whether it is within or 
outside New Zealand), or any 
member or employee of any local 
authority or public body, or any 
person employed in the education 
service within the meaning of the 
State Sector Act 1988.
In light of the above, the creation of 
the new offence of trading in influence 
can be admired both for its adherence to 
the letter and spirit of UNCAC, and also 
because it is potentially more far-sighted 
than may first appear.
Syndromes of corruption
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the 
new offence is that trading in influence 
(often referred to as influence marketing) 
has long been identified as the most 
common form of corruption in developed, 
Western economies. Most notably, Michael 
Johnston (2005) has labelled trading in 
influence as one of the four ‘syndromes of 
corruption’ that can be used to describe 
and explain corrupt practices in different 
jurisdictions around the world, alongside 
official moguls, clans and oligarchs, and 
elite cartels (see Figure 1). 
Johnston argues that, despite what 
common wisdom suggests, corruption of 
varying degrees occurs throughout the 
world. The form it takes is dependent on 
the social, political and economic regimes 
in which the behaviour takes place. Most 
academic attention is paid towards 
corruption in developing nations, a bias 
that is strongly reflected if not reified in 
the broader international policy and 
development climate. Yet Johnston 
suggests that as a result of this, the 
corruption that is manifested in many 
highly developed economies (and 
frequently in liberal democracies) goes 
either unnoticed or ignored. Indeed, not 
only are such activities not regarded as 
corruption, but they are actually seen as 
legitimate. 
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Article 18. Trading in influence
Each State Party shall consider adopting such 
legislative and other measures as may be necessary 
to establish as criminal offences, when committed 
intentionally:
(a) The promise, offering or giving to a public official 
or any other person, directly or indirectly, of an 
undue advantage in order that the public official 
or the person abuse his or her real or supposed 
influence with a view to obtaining from an 
administration or public authority of the State 
Party an undue advantage for the original 
instigator of the act or for any other person;
(b) The solicitation or acceptance by a public official 
or any other person, directly or indirectly, of an 
undue advantage for himself or herself or for 
another person in order that the public official or 
the person abuse his or her real or supposed 
influence with a view to obtaining from an 
administration or public authority of the State 
Party an undue advantage.
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Figure 1: The four syndromes of corruption (adapted from Johnston, 2005)
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The four syndromes Johnston 
identifies are ideal types which are useful 
in expanding on how corruption can be 
viewed, but they also have a statistical 
backing: Johnston groups nations into the 
four types through a cluster analysis 
across a wide range of political and 
economic indicators.3 This subsequently 
broadly corresponded to the Corruption 
Perceptions Index ranking of the nations 
in each group, and on further analysis of 
the countries Johnston categorised, the 
groupings still correspond well.
For developed liberal democracies, 
which are the locus of the ‘influence 
markets’ syndrome, Johnston refers to 
institutions that are strong enough to 
avoid being circumvented by forms of 
corruption such as blatant bribery. The 
corruption that does exist in such nations, 
therefore, happens within the remit of 
those institutions – political parties and 
government ministries, for example – and 
is usually well within the bounds of how 
such institutions are in fact designed to 
work. What is a key problem, and a reason 
why trading in influence should be seen as 
corruption, is that it damages and 
degrades the trust the public has in these 
structures. Citizens do not believe that 
they can have influence over what occurs 
in government, and this perception is, in 
Johnston’s view, a serious problem.
Johnston suggests that political 
influence is essentially a commodity that 
can be bought or sold (or traded) through 
different channels, most of which are 
accepted as part of the political landscape. 
Indeed, many of them have effectively had 
industries built around them. Typically 
these include areas such as lobbying, 
political party funding, patronage, 
revolving doors of post-ministerial 
appointments, misuse of corporate 
hospitality, gifts and various others. 
As previous studies have indicated, 
one of the key issues for debate here is the 
problem of access versus influence. Access 
to politicians is easy to determine: it is 
usually clear who has access to politicians 
and decision makers. What is less clear is 
the extent to which this may, or may not, 
lead to any influence being passed around. 
This highlights the limitations of 
transparency: ‘we used to think that 
sunlight was the best disinfectant, but 
now we see that it only creates more 
shadows in which to hide’ (Macaulay, 
2011).
Johnston focused his attention on 
three nations to explore trading in 
influence: the United States, Germany and 
Japan. Particularly interesting is how the 
situation in the United States has changed 
in the decade or so since he wrote 
Syndromes of Corruption. He identifies the 
problem of political donations in the US 
and how it means that political 
competition, even in ‘free elections’, is 
crippled. This is perhaps even starker now, 
with the 2010 Citizens United decision 
opening up even greater amounts of 
money for favoured political causes. In an 
example of the expanded legitimacy of 
money in government, the corruption 
charges against Robert McDonnell during 
his tenure as governor of Virginia have 
been vacated by the Supreme Court, an 
act which Johnston himself commented 
on in the media as constituting a new, and 
overly narrow, definition of corruption 
(Johnston, 2016). Johnston and the wider 
literature (Johnston and Dana, 2012; 
Etizoni, 2014) have also commented more 
recently on political capture and the 
undermining of political legitimacy by 
influence peddling.
Although Johnston did not focus his 
attention on the United Kingdom, it has 
seen numerous examples in recent years 
of a variety of forms of trading in 
influence. To start with an obvious 
example, the Conservative Party Leader’s 
Group allows members direct meetings 
and engagements with the prime minister 
for an annual fee of £50,000.5 The Leader’s 
Group is certainly transparent and the list 
of its donors is readily available for public 
view.6 What can never be clear, however, is 
the extent to which this access ever 
becomes translated into something more. 
What is clear is that the Leader’s Group 
donated £43 million to the Conservative 
Party during 2012–14 alone (Graham, 
2014). 
A further example has recently 
emerged in terms of the power of 
patronage. Confirming what many have 
suspected for decades, a 2015 study from 
Oxford University demonstrated a 
conclusive link between political party 
donations and government appointments 
to the House of Lords. These are no mere 
vanity appointments, as party donations 
can buy people a direct seat at the 
legislative table (Mell, Radford and 
Thévoz, 2015). This study was undertaken 
at a time when the British government has 
been making an anti-corruption push on 
the global stage, even hosting an 
international summit on the subject 
(United Kingdom Government, 2016). 
Others in the public arena (Sachs, 2016; 
Oxfam, 2016) have criticised this because 
of the role developed nations have in 
allowing corporations to exploit 
developing nations; but in addition to 
this, corruption within the United 
Kingdom has come under public scrutiny 
(Short, 2016).
Between the UK summit and the 
prominence of UNCAC, anti-corruption 
legislation and pressure has been 
mounting. Many developed nations, 
Figure 2: Johnston’s corruption syndrome groupings4 versus Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2015
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however, have pushed away from some of 
the themes in the international discourse, 
and in particular trading in influence. As 
stated before, New Zealand is one of the 
first countries to have explicitly 
criminalised it, despite international 
agreements calling for such legislation to 
be passed. Article 12 of the Council of 
Europe’s Criminal Convention on 
Corruption has called for the 
criminalisation of trading in influence 
since 1999, and yet, even for those states 
that have ratified the convention, over a 
quarter have expressed reservations about 
article 12. Slingerland (2011) applies 
article 12 to two prominent cases of 
trading in influence – the management of 
DSB Bank (Dirk Scheringa Bank) and the 
financing of Nicolas Sarkozy’s 2007 
election campaign – and explores the 
difficulty of trying to apply a rigid 
definition of the phenomenon. The 
unclear nature of trading in influence is, 
according to Slingerland, a primary reason 
why states are reluctant to criminalise it, 
for fear of sweeping up ‘legitimate’ 
political influence such as lobbying.
The difficulty of defining corruption is 
not limited just to writing international 
law, however. Johnston devoted pages to 
trying to set a definition (2005, pp.1-15), 
and even then simply settled on one that 
was usable for his project. There are 
multiple comparisons of anti-bribery and 
corruption legislation (for example, CMS, 
2014), and the absence of a definition of 
corruption is commented on. Part of the 
issue is that many pieces of legislation 
define corruption using terms such as 
‘undue influence’, ‘acting contrary to their 
duty’ or, tautologically, ‘corruptly offering’. 
What seems clear is that there is a 
qualitative component to corruption 
implied in most, if not all, legislation 
regarding corruption, and this includes 
the New Zealand case. 
A New Zealand problem?
New Zealand prides itself on its reputation 
for integrity and a lack of corruption. Yet 
many of these forms of trading in influence 
have been identified as being prevalent 
in the political system. Transparency 
International New Zealand’s 2013 
National Integrity System study found 
that there are problems around ‘grey 
areas’: party funding; patronage; perceived 
nepotism and/or cronyism; unresolved 
conflicts of interest; misuse of lobbying, 
etc. Essentially these problems are of the 
same type as identified by Johnston, and 
which can be found throughout the US, 
UK and continental Europe.
There is also, of course, a New Zealand 
equivalent of the Leader’s Group: the 
Cabinet Club. Although this has been 
dismissed by some as ‘no suggestion of 
cash for access’ (3News, 2014), there is an 
obvious concern that anonymous 
donations can grant a person direct 
contact (however innocent) with a 
member of the government. Although we 
do not seek to offer a comprehensive 
overview here, it is useful to flesh out 
some recent examples that suggest a prima 
facie case of trading in influence within 
New Zealand (see Table 1).
In 2012 the Lobbying Disclosure Bill 
was drawn. First introduced by Sue 
Kedgley, and subsequently reintroduced 
by Holly Walker, the bill sought to ‘bring a 
measure of transparency and public 
disclosure around the lobbying activity 
directed at members of Parliament and 
their staff, and in so doing to enhance 
trust in the integrity and impartiality of 
democracy and political decision making’ 
(Lobbying Disclosure Bill, 2012, 
explanatory note). It passed the first 
reading and was sent to the government 
administration select committee, where it 
was not recommended for further passage. 
Instead it was recommended that 
Parliament use non-legislative measures 
to strengthen departmental reporting and 
guidelines for how ministers report their 
activity. Much of the political and media 
response to the bill was negative, and 
focused on two areas: the belief that New 
Zealand does not have the same problems 
with lobbying as exist worldwide; and the 
argument that by mandating that lobbyists 
be registered, it would discourage ordinary 
citizens from talking to their 
representatives. Submissions on the bill, 
including from unions (for example, the 
Service and Food Workers’ Union) and 
businesses (for example, McDonald’s 
Restaurants (New Zealand)) spoke about 
the ‘chilling effect’ legislation might have 
if ‘ordinary citizens’ were caught up and 
labelled as ‘lobbyists’. The debate during 
the first reading often brought up New 
Zealand’s ranking in Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index (Hansard, 2012) and opponents 
used this to argue that while examining 
the role of lobbyists was a useful and 
important task, New Zealand did not have 
a problem of corruption. It will be 
interesting, however, to see if the bill will 
gain a second wind in the years to come, 
as the new offence of trading in influence 
could well provoke a legal conundrum for 
lobbying. 
Alongside the issue of lobbying often 
comes the question of political donations. 
Often those speaking against the Lobbying 
Disclosure Bill compared New Zealand 
favourably to America, and the 
phenomenon of lobbying is closely related 
to that of political donations: they are 
both discussed by Johnston, and both can 
cause perceptions of disempowerment 
among citizens. In New Zealand there has 
been some recent scrutiny of the Cabinet 
Club, where individuals pay a certain 
amount to National Party electorate 
organisations in return for being invited 
to dinners and other social functions with 
members of Parliament and ministers 
(3News, 2014). Representatives who have 
taken part in these ‘clubs’ vehemently 
deny any notion of ‘cash for access’, 
Table 1: An overview of trading in influence in New Zealand
Lobbying Failure of Register of Lobbyists Bill
Political donations Cabinet Club
Revolving doors Appointments to public boards
Patronage Debate in Hansard, 19 March 2014:
Tony Astle – $60,000 Officer of New Zealand Order of 
Merit
Chris Parkin – $66,000 Companion of New Zealand 
Order of Merit
Sir William Gallagher – $25,000 knighthood
Cronyism Appointment to GCSB
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pointing out that the donations are 
declared and that anyone can set up an 
appointment to see a minister about an 
issue by contacting their office. Similarly 
to the defence Judith Collins gave about 
her association with Oravida – ‘just 
popping around for a cup of tea’ – the 
Cabinet Club has been described as ‘pizza 
politics’ – casual, informal interaction 
between politicians and citizens. Ministers 
have also claimed that they are not acting 
in any way as ministers, just members of 
Parliament, when they go to such dinners 
(although the name Cabinet Club might 
make such a response less convincing). 
Nevertheless, the majority of citizens 
would not be able to afford to join the 
Cabinet Club, and this again raises the 
question of access, influence, and who 
gets to have them. 
Judith Collins’ dinner at Oravida 
during a state-funded visit to China is one 
of the more well-known and commonly 
seen as ‘corruption’ scandals of the 
National government. Oravida, a New 
Zealand company which exports goods to 
China, had a history with the National 
Party and with Judith Collins in particular: 
it had made donations to National in the 
past (Gower, 2014); Collins had opened 
the company’s Auckland headquarters 
that same month; and one of the directors 
of the company was her husband (3News, 
2014). This visit to the company while in 
China was not reported in the minister’s 
report; nor was it notified before she left. 
This was picked up by the media and the 
opposition, and Collins came under 
concerted criticism for her actions. She 
denied any conflict of interest in her visit 
(Collins, 2014) and in the media described 
it as ‘popping in for tea’, focusing on the 
casual nature of the dinner as a defence 
against corruption allegations. It was 
apparent from the rebuttal that for such 
an event to be seen as corruption by the 
government there would need to be an 
obvious, knowledgeable financial 
advantage to be made: in effect, there 
would have to be a bribe. The concept of 
trading in influence and the syndromes of 
corruption that Johnston discusses are, 
however, broader than this and could be 
applied to the Oravida scandal. 
Interestingly enough, that very same 
day in Parliament saw the passage of the 
Families Commission Amendment Bill, 
within which another aspect of potential 
influence trading came under debate: the 
appointment of individuals to public 
boards. Both sides of the House were 
accused of political placements to the 
Families Commission, and of trying to 
use legislatively independent bodies to 
further ideological agendas. It seems 
almost inevitable that any government 
will run into accusations that they are 
making ‘political appointments’, and this 
is an accusation that has been levelled at 
both Labour (Farrar, 2013) and National 
(Macskasy, 2013) governments. Like with 
lobbying, the appointment of people to 
boards and commissions in the public 
sphere is an area where the line between 
legitimate and corrupt is difficult to 
clarify. Naturally those who are appointed 
to positions involving advocacy or public 
work need to have experience and 
exposure in that area, and often the only 
way to get such experience and exposure 
is through the political sphere. Similarly 
to lobbying, however, there is an issue of 
capture: if such appointments are not 
viewed with scrutiny there is a risk that 
supposedly ‘independent’ organisations 
become overly bound to the government 
of the day’s policy direction, enhancing 
the feeling of exclusion on the part of the 
public which Johnston identifies as a key 
outcome of such syndromes of corruption. 
While New Zealand does not give 
those who are rewarded by the honours 
system the same legislative role as does the 
system in the United Kingdom, as 
mentioned above, the system has been an 
area where accusations of cronyism have 
been levelled in the past. Almost 
immediately after the National 
government brought back knighthoods in 
2009 the spectre of cronyism was raised in 
the media (Watkins, 2009). This has 
continued through to recent years when 
the honouring of business people, 
especially those who have made large 
donations to the governmental party, 
could be seen as problematic. It may be 
worth asking, however, how much citizens 
care about this when no legislative role is 
involved. Even with the reaction to UK 
prime minister David Cameron’s 
resignation honours earlier this year there 
was a sense from some that people getting 
titles wasn’t a big deal (Clark, 2016). It too 
can be viewed, however, through the lens 
of influence peddling. A potential 
hypothesis to explore might be in what 
influence honours give individuals, both 
in the public sphere and private. 
Does New Zealand have a case to answer?
Whether or not trading in influence is 
seen as a problem in New Zealand will 
very much depend on one’s perspective 
on what constitutes legitimate political 
activity. This article does not seek to cast 
moral aspersions on any of them. What 
it set out to do was to scope out some of 
the examples of trading in influence that 
have been identified elsewhere (both in 
literature and in practice) and ascertain 
whether or not these could be found 
within New Zealand. It is unquestionable 
that they can: it is no exaggeration 
to suggest that most of our political 
institutions and processes rely to some 
degree or other on influence.
The research agenda now is to look at a 
number of questions:
•	 Just	how	prevalent	is	each	of	these	
forms of trading in influence within 
the political system?
•	 Just	how	detrimental	is	each	of	these	
forms of trading in influence to New 
Zealand’s political life?
Judith Collins’ dinner at Oravida during a 
state-funded visit to China is one of the 
more well-known and commonly seen 
as ‘corruption’ scandals of the National 
government.
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•	 What	are	the	implications	of	these	
activities in light of the new offence in 
the Crimes Act, section 105F?
•	 What	might	constitute	the	proper	
forms of such activities?
•	 What	is	the	most	appropriate	way	to	
regulate these activities?
We do not doubt that there are more 
questions that can be asked, but we feel 
that these are a healthy start. What is 
needed is serious research and balanced 
debate: there can be no moral witch-hunts 
if we are to make constructive progress. 
We must take these issues seriously. As 
recent surveys have indicated, trust in 
politicians and government is at an 
incredibly low level (Institute for 
Governance and Policy Studies, 2016). 
There has been mounting criticism of 
New Zealand’s attitude towards its 
international commitments in this area, 
such as the open government partnership.
Answering these questions will involve 
a number of key methodological 
challenges, something quite common for 
projects which seek to implement a degree 
of empiricism in studying corruption. 
Corruption by its nature is hidden and 
not in the open; it cannot be simply 
quantified. This is likely to be particularly 
true of trading in influence, since the 
concept involves so many small-scale 
interactions between lawmakers and 
influencers. White (2013) links the 
stereotypical nature of international and 
headline-grabbing corruption (bribes, 
kickbacks and the like) to a common 
image of corruption as almost a 
pantomime of tan briefcases changing 
hands. For this research, a more subtle 
and nuanced approach must be taken.
Commonly, perceptions of corruption 
have been used as a proxy for corruption 
itself, such as in Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index. The problem here is that it is 
certainly possible for corruption to 
happen when there is a high perception of 
transparency on the part of the 
government, such as the case in Iceland 
before the financial crisis (Erlingsson, 
Linde and Öhrvall, 2016). In addition, 
attempts to curtail lobbying corruption 
through campaign finance law in the US 
had little to no effect on perceptions of 
corruption, making such data of little use 
in understanding real levels of corruption 
(Persily and Lammie, 2004). 
Different approaches must be taken, 
therefore, although perceptions do 
undoubtedly play a role in understanding 
trading in influence. One possibility is to 
look at understandings of what is ‘normal’, 
both within political circles and in the 
wider public arena. Looking more closely 
at instances where potentially corrupt 
situations have arisen and unpacking the 
process through which they happened 
would also shed some light. In conjunction 
with such qualitative methods, there are 
also opportunities to utilise quantitative 
tools. These would be particularly useful 
in analysing flows of donations, political 
activities, and their relation to 
appointments, honours and (though with 
more difficulty) favourable policy 
changes. 
We suggest, therefore, that there is a 
clear research agenda to be taken forward 
in New Zealand. Each of these forms of 
trading in influence needs to be 
thoroughly defined and categorised. More 
importantly, the impact that they have 
had needs to be identified and elucidated, 
not only in terms of hard metrics (for 
example, who has donated what, and with 
what outcome), but the more nuanced 
issue of people’s daily lived experiences. 
Only then can we start to work on 
solutions to strengthen our collective 
integrity.
1 ‘Small value’ has not, of course, been defined.
2 Australia also kept a defence for such small bribes and was 
strongly admonished by the UNCAC evaluation team in 
2012.
3 Johnston (2005) used the polity scores from 1992 and 
2001, the Economic Freedom in the World Index from 1990 
and 2001, the World Economic Forum’s Environmental 
Sustainability Index from 2002, and the Heritage 
Foundation’s Security of Property Rights Index. 
4 1=influence markets; 2=elite cartels; 3=oligarchs and 
clans; 4=official moguls.
5 For all Conservative Party donor groups see https://www.
conservatives.com/donate/Donor_Clubs. 
6 https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/
Downloadable%20Files/Donors/LG%20Meals%20Q4%20
2014.ashx.
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Victoria Professional and Executive Development
High quality professional and executive development courses specifically designed  
for the public sector:
We can also deliver in-house courses, customise existing courses or design new programmes to suit your requirements 
We now also run courses at our Auckland training rooms.
For more course dates, further information and to enrol visit www.victoria.ac.nz/profdev or call us on 04-463 6556.
MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT
-> Fri 12 May, 9am–4:30pm
-> Fri 23 June, 9am–4:30pm
STRATEGIC NEGOTIATION
-> Tue 16 & Wed 17 May, 9am–4:30pm
PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCE FUNDAMENTALS
-> Fri 19 May, 9am–4:30pm
EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY DECISIONS
-> Mon 22 & Tue 23 May, 9am–4pm
ENGAGING EFFECTIVELY WITH YOUR STAKEHOLDERS
-> Wed 31 May, 9am-4:30pm
DESIGN THINKING FUNDAMENTALS: 1 DAY CONDENSED 
BOOTCAMP
-> Thu 1 June, 9am–5:30pm
INTRODUCTION TO ACCOUNTING FOR  
NON-ACCOUNTANTS
-> Fri 9 June, 9am–4:30pm
STRATEGIC THINKING FOR GOVERNMENT
-> Fri 16 June, 9am–4:30pm
UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND 
BUDGETS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
-> Tue 27 & Wed 28 June, 9am–4:30pm
MANAGING STAKEHOLDERS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH
-> Fri 30 June, 9am–4:30pm
ADVANCED POLICY LEADERSHIP WORKSHOP
-> Tue 4 & Wed 5 July, 9am–4:30pm
MĀORI CULTURAL COMPETENCY
-> Wed 19July, 9am–4pm
SYSTEMS THINKING
-> Wed 26 & Thu 27 July, 9am–4:30pm
USING DATA: DISCOVERY, ANALYSIS, VISUALISATION 
AND DECISION-MAKING
-> Mon 31 July & Tue 1 Aug, 9am–5pm
